In practice, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) vastly outnumber Customs Unions 
Introduction
Since the early 1990s, the world has witnessed unprecedented growth of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). While only around 50 in the late 1980s (Figure B.1, WTO (2011) ), nearly 300 PTAs were in force and noti…ed to the WTO by April 2017.
1 This trend has spawned numerous strands of literature, both empirical, e.g. what characteristics determine PTA partners (e.g. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Chen and Joshi (2010) ), and theoretical, e.g. whether PTAs are "building blocs" or "stumbling blocs" en route to global free trade (Bhagwati (1991) ). Despite some important Customs Unions (CUs) covering substantial bilateral trade relationships (e.g. among members of the European Union (EU)), the sheer number of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) vastly outnumber CUs with the WTO (2011, p.6) listing this phenomenon as one their …ve stylized facts regarding PTA formation. 2 However, as recently argued by Melatos and Woodland (2007a, p.904) and Facchini et al. (2012, p.136) , the lack of literature explaining this fact is surprising because the existing literature largely suggests CUs are the optimal type of PTA for members. Unsurprisingly, the standard reason for the attractiveness of CUs relative to FTAs rests on a coordination bene…t whereby CU members coordinate their external tari¤s. In practice, complications associated with tari¤ revenue sharing and choosing the level of the common external tari¤ may weaken this coordination bene…t.
3 Nevertheless, the requirement that CU members set a common external tari¤ implies that individual CU members do not have the ‡exibility to form their own subsequent PTAs. 4 That is, FTAs possess a dynamic ‡exibility bene…t because they allow individual FTA members to form future agreements. Indeed, this notion of an FTA ‡exibility bene…t has permeated the mainstream media. Some have argued that the common external tari¤ of the MERCOSUR CU has prevented Uruguay from forming an FTA with the US. 5 Similar arguments have been made in that the UK (in either the pre-Brexit or post-Brexit world) and Turkey should have FTAs rather than CUs with the EU to exploit the FTA ‡exibility bene…t. 2 FTAs di¤er from CUs because FTA members individually set their tari¤s on non-members while CU members set common tari¤s on non-members.
3 See Gatsios and Karp (1991) , Syropoulos (2002 Syropoulos ( , 2003 and Woodland (2007b, 2009 ) for theoretical models that take these complications seriously. 4 If an individual CU member forms a PTA with a non-member then these two countries eliminate tari¤s between themselves. But then the other CU members still have nonzero tari¤s with the non-member which violates the common external tari¤. 5 See http://en.mercopress.com/2011/03/11/how-argentina-torpedoed-uruguay-s-fta-with-the-us-according- 6 For the UK case in the post-Brexit world, Dhingra and Sampson (2016, p.10 ) point out that "...
Brexit would enable the UK to seek trade agreements tailored to the interests of UK businesses and consumers rather than having to make compromises to meet the needs of Using a three country dynamic model where PTAs form over time and countries choose between FTAs and CUs, I highlight how the ‡exibility bene…t of FTAs helps explain the prevalence of FTAs relative to CUs. In the background, intra-industry trade in segmented international markets is characterized by oligopolistic competition and countries with asymmetric market size. With an eye towards insights relating market size asymmetry to the relative prevalence of FTAs versus CUs, I follow Saggi et al. (2013) and focus on two forms of asymmetry: a "large"world with two large countries and one small country and a "small" world case with two small countries and one large country. 7 For the protocol governing PTA formation, I follow the spirit of Aghion et al. (2007) and assume the large country, or one of the large countries, is the "leader country"who can make PTA proposals each period. But, unlike Aghion et al. (2007) , I assume the other countries can propose PTAs if they reject the leader country's proposal or the leader country makes no proposal.
The tension between the FTA ‡exibility and CU coordination bene…ts shape whether CUs or FTAs emerge in equilibrium. Because individual FTA members set their own external tari¤s on non-members, individual FTA members have the ‡exibility to form future FTAs with non-members. Thus, FTA formation permits a country to become the "hub" whereby it has FTAs with each of the other two countries but these "spoke" countries do not have an FTA between themselves. Forward looking countries value this FTA ‡exibility bene…t because it a¤ords sole reciprocal preferential access in the future with each spoke country.
Conversely, CUs possess a coordination bene…t which, in general, consists of myopic and forward looking components. The "myopic CU coordination bene…t"is merely the di¤erence between the one period CU and FTA payo¤s. Like many other models, the oligopoly model features the well known phenomena of tari¤ complementarity (i.e. PTA members voluntarily reduce tari¤s on non-members). Because this represents an intra-PTA negative externality, the coordination of external tari¤s confers a myopic coordination bene…t on CUs. Absent any forward looking components of the CU coordination bene…t, the discount factor mediates the relative magnitude of the FTA ‡exibility and myopic CU coordination bene…ts with the FTA ‡exibility bene…t dominating when countries are su¢ ciently patient.
Because of the CU common external tari¤, CU expansion that includes the non-member other EU countries". For the UK case in a pre-Brexit world, see Hannan (2012) . For the Turkish case, see, for example, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2013/05/26/ Turkey-fears-being-left-out-in-the-cold-by-EU-free-trade-deals-.html. The Turkish case is somewhat di¤erent in that, as part of its CU with the EU, and perhaps in anticipation of EU membership, Turkey agreed to extend any external tari¤ concessions to future FTA partners of the EU, https: //www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-12/turkey-deserves-a-better-eu-trade-deal.
requires joint member approval. CU members value the joint approval feature of CUs when they hold a "CU exclusion incentive" meaning that they want to exclude the non-member because CU expansion lowers member payo¤s. Here, CU members can block CU expansion to global free trade whereas an FTA member may precipitate global free trade by exploiting the myopic incentive to become the hub. In turn, this "joint authority motive" represents the forward looking component of the CU coordination bene…t. Thus, in the presence of a CU exclusion incentive, the FTA ‡exibility bene…t only outweighs the CU coordination bene…ts when countries are neither su¢ ciently patient nor su¢ ciently impatient.
Intuitively, the key insight underlying the underlying the equilibrium structure is that second largest country is more likely to accept an FTA proposal from the leader country when the leader country has other similarly attractive partners with whom it could instead form an FTA. While the large leader country may prefer FTA formation over CU formation to exploit the FTA ‡exibility bene…t, its PTA partner prefers CU formation. Speci…cally, the second largest country prefers a CU rather than an FTA with the large leader country because it cannot become the hub and obtain the FTA ‡exibility bene…t. Thus, to induce the second largest country's acceptance of an FTA proposal, the large leader country must threaten that it would prefer an FTA with the smallest country rather than ceding a CU with the second largest country. To the extent that the second largest country is larger than the smallest country, and hence a more attractive PTA partner, the myopic CU coordination bene…t grows. Indeed, this growth in the CU coordination bene…t drives the key observation that the prevalence of FTA relative to CU formation is higher in a "small world" than a "large world". Indeed, this logic plays an important role in Section 3.3 when discussing real world CUs and FTAs in Europe and South America. This paper is closely related to the three-country static model of Missios et al. (2016) . There, countries hold FTA and CU exclusion incentives: members of any bilateral PTA receive a higher payo¤ than under global free trade and, hence, want to exclude the PTA non-member from expansion to a three-country PTA. Missios et al. (2016) show that, unlike FTAs, CUs undermine global free trade. The joint authority motive allows CU members to block CU expansion but FTA formation yields global free because, in equilibrium, the ‡exibility of FTAs prevents members exploiting their FTA exclusion incentive.
Conceptually, the most important di¤erence between this paper and Missios et al. (2016) is that my model characterizes the situations where the ‡exibility of FTAs generates the endogenous equilibrium emergence of FTAs rather than CUs. Indeed, as described above, FTAs rather than CUs emerge in equilibrium when the FTA ‡exibility bene…t dominates the CU coordination bene…t. Although their analysis focuses on comparing a "CU formation game" versus an "FTA formation game", Missios et al. (2016) extend their main analysis to allow for the endogenous choice between FTAs and CUs. However, CUs always emerge endogenously because the ‡exibility of FTAs prevents exploitation of the FTA exclusion incentive in their static setting. However, my dynamic setting allows an FTA member to exploit the FTA ‡exibility bene…t by becoming the hub on the path to global free trade. Thus, my results rely on forward looking motivations which are fundamentally di¤erent economic motivations than the static motivations of Missios et al. (2016) . This paper is also closely related to a small literature investigating how broad notions of ‡exibility and coordination a¤ect the endogenous choice between CUs and FTAs. In a dynamic three-country model, Seidmann (2009) views countries as bargaining over surplus division from PTA formation. Even though global free trade maximizes the aggregate payo¤, and hence global free trade always emerges in equilibrium, countries can use PTA formation along the path to global free trade to strategically in ‡uence their outside options and, thus, the bargaining outcome under global free trade. When an initial PTA bene…ts the insiders relative to the outsider, the insiders can manipulate the outside options and "strategically position"themselves to extract more than their equal share of the global free trade surplus. But doing so requires direct expansion of a bilateral PTA to global free trade which makes a CU more attractive to PTA insiders than an FTA. That is, the ‡exibility of FTAs makes FTAs problematic for exploiting the "strategic positioning"motive.
Indeed, given the trade model in this paper, FTAs never emerge in equilibrium in Seidmann (2009) . In this paper, countries enjoy a myopic CU coordination bene…t, via eliminating the negative intra-PTA externality of tari¤ complementarity, whereby the one period payo¤ as a CU insider exceeds that as an FTA insider. Moreover, countries prefer being a CU insider over being discriminated against as a CU outsider. Under these conditions, equilibrium FTAs never emerge in Seidmann (2009) , contrasting starkly with the equilibria of this paper driven by the fundamental trade o¤ between the FTA ‡exibility and CU coordination bene…ts.
8 Formally, this contrast emerges from (i) the presence versus absence of transfers, which crucially impacts the motives of PTA formation, and (ii) the protocol described above which, e¤ectively, ensures the large country becomes the hub in a hub-spoke network, solidifying the FTA ‡exibility bene…t, versus Seidmann's protocol where the country proposing PTAs changes over time, severely weakening the FTA ‡exibility bene…t. Despite a static setting, Appelbaum and Melatos (2016) show uncertainty generates a coordination- ‡exibility trade-o¤ underlying the choice between CUs and FTAs. When cost and demand uncertainties are realized after PTA formation but prior to tari¤ setting, the type of uncertainty matters greatly. Because larger di¤erences in market size polarize each 8 Sepci…cally, see Theorem 3.3 in Seidmann (2009, p.148) country's ideal external tari¤, greater demand uncertainty makes FTAs more attractive relative to CUs. Conversely, greater cost uncertainty makes CUs more attractive relative to FTAs because larger cost di¤erences increase the value of coordinating external tari¤s to internalize the negative intra-PTA externalities posed by tari¤ complementarity. Note, this ‡exibility-coordination tension derives from myopic tari¤ setting motivations. In contrast, forward looking motivations drive the ‡exibility-coordination tension underlying my results.
Unlike the static but "uncertain trading environment"of Appelbaum and Melatos (2016) , Melatos and Dunn (2013) analyze a dynamic and "changing trading environment"that also features notions of ‡exibility and coordination. The most important di¤erences between Melatos and Dunn (2013) and the current paper are the fundamentally di¤erent economic environment and, in turn, the fundamentally di¤erent question of interest. Using a threecountry two-period model, Melatos and Dunn (2013) analyze how the types of PTAs formed in period one depend on changes to the world trading system in period two via (i) entrance of a third country or (ii) departure of an existing country. 9 In practice, part of the prevalence that FTAs have over CUs may be driven by countries anticipating other countries may enter or leave the world trading system in the future. However, the overwhelming pervasiveness of FTAs relative to CUs also suggests a mechanism that does not rely on such anticipations.
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Finally, this paper relates to the small, but broader, literature analyzing the endogenous choice between CUs and FTAs. While Riezman (1999) …nds CU formation emerges when there are two large countries and one small country (because such countries have a "CU exclusion incentive"), FTAs never emerge in equilibrium. Similarly, Melatos and Woodland (2007a) …nd FTAs never emerge in a unique equilibrium despite greater preference or endowment asymmetries between countries increasing the attractiveness of FTAs relative to CUs. Conversely, Facchini et al. (2012) …nd FTAs rather than CUs emerge in equilibrium when income inequality is not too high but CUs can only emerge in equilibrium when members have low income inequality and share similar production structures. Because of their static nature, none of these papers address the ‡exibility versus coordination issue at the heart of this paper and only Facchini et al. (2012) addresses the prevalence of FTAs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the game theoretic and network theoretic structure of PTA formation and also describes the underlying oligopolistic economic 9 Speci…cally, the former is modelled as an autarkic period one country becoming non-autarkic in period two while the latter is modelled as a non-autarkic period two country becoming (with respect to countries with whom it has not formed a PTA) autarkic in period two. The obvious motivation for the former is WTO accession by countries like China or Russia.
10 This paper also di¤ers in a number of other ways from Melatos and Dunn (2013) . First, I do not assume a discount factor equal to one; indeed, I show that whether the FTA ‡exibility bene…t outweighs the CU coordination bene…t depends on the discount factor. Second, I do not rely on simulations to establish equilibria. Third, I adopt a non-cooperative rather than a cooperative solution concept. structure. Section 3 describes the equilibrium path of PTA networks in the "large world" and "small world" environments and also links the theoretical results to real world PTA formation in Europe and South America. Section 4 discusses extensions and interpretations of the baseline analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains all proofs.
Model
This section serves three purposes. First, Section 2.1 introduces basic notation that describes the PTA network and country payo¤s. Section 2.1 also describes how the network of PTAs can evolve over time. Second, Section 2.2 describes the oligopolistic model of trade. While this is an intra-industry model of trade in imperfectly competitive markets, Section 4.1 shows the results are robust to a competing exporters model where inter-industry trade in perfectly competitive markets stems from supply-side comparative advantage forces. Third, Section 2.3 formally describes the strategies of countries and the equilibrium concept.
Preliminaries
Starting with Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Furusawa and Konishi (2007) , the trade agreement literature has borrowed useful notation and terminology from the network literature to describe networks of PTAs. Visually, the network literature views players as nodes on a "graph" and views edges between nodes as bilateral "links" between players. The graph g is then described by the set of bilateral links between players. As recognized by Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Furusawa and Konishi (2007) , this network language can compactly describe networks of PTAs by recognizing FTAs and CUs as links between countries. Figure 1 describes the possible networks and terminology between three countries i, j and k. In the absence of any FTAs or CUs, g ? denotes the "empty network". When countries i and j have the sole FTA, g
Network at beginning of current period Network at end of current period g ? g ? ; g Table 1 illustrates the feasible transitions in any given period with g t 1 ! g t denoting the feasible transition when the network at the beginning of the current period is g t 1 and the network at the end of the current period is g t . In turn, the network remains unchanged forever once one of the following conditions are met: (i) no agreement forms in a given period or (ii) global free trade is attained. In the former case, the assumption below of Markov strategies implies no agreement will form in any subsequent period. In the latter case, the above assumption that previously formed agreements cannot be severed implies global free trade remains forever once attained. Thus, ultimately, the network remains unchanged from no later than the third period onwards. Given a network g, country i's one period payo¤ is denoted v i (g) with Section 2.2 describing how v i (g) depends on the network structure in the oligopoly model. Given the 11 Many authors (e.g. Ornelas (2008) and Ornelas and Liu (2012) ) argue the binding nature of trade agreements is both realistic, in terms of real world observation, and pervasive in the literature. They also argue realism as a reduced form shorthand for more structural justi…cations such as sunk costs (see McLaren (2002) and, for empirical support, Freund and McLaren (1999) ).
12 Essentially, I interpret a period as the required time to negotiate an agreement. Indeed, negotiations often take many years to complete; for example, despite not being signed until 1992, NAFTA negotiations date back to 1986 (Odell (2006, p.193) ). I discuss this issue further in Section 4.5.
dynamic nature of the model, countries also have continuation payo¤s in period t resulting from the in…nite sequence of transitions g t 1 ! g t ! g t+1 ! :::. Because the context will make clear the sequence of transitions beyond g t , I simply let V i (g t ) denote the continuation payo¤ for country i resulting from the current period transition g t 1 ! g t and the future transitions g t ! g t+1 ! g t+2 ! :::. Because the network remains unchanged forever from no later than the third period onwards, as explained above, I let the last network in the sequence of transitions denote the network that remains in place forever after.
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For concreteness, consider the current period transition g ? ! g F T A ij and the future transitions g
F T where, as described above, g F T remains forever once attained.
Then, letting 2 (0; 1) denote the common discount factor, country i's continuation payo¤ in the current period is V i g
Alternatively, country i's continuation payo¤ in the current period from the current period transition g ? ! g
CU ij
followed by no further agreements in any subsequent period is V i g
Oligopolistic model of trade
Three countries each have a single …rm producing a homogenous good in segmented international markets. x ij denotes the quantity sold by country i in country j's market. Country
14 Assuming a common and constant marginal cost normalized to zero, the …rm from country i faces the standard maximization problem in country j:
Given a network g, the equilibrium quantity is x ij ( j ; g) = 1 4
is the number of countries facing a zero tari¤ in country j (including country j itself), (ii) per WTO rules, j is the MFN (Most Favored Nation), i.e. non-discriminatory, tari¤ faced by countries who do not have an FTA with country j and (iii) ji (g) is the tari¤ imposed by country j on country i given the network g and, thus, takes on the value zero if i and j are PTA partners but j if i and j are not PTA partners. Ruling out prohibitive tari¤s, country i's equilibrium pro…ts in country j are ij ( j ; g) = x ij ( j ; g) 2 and country 13 For example, the sequence of transitions g ? ! g
indicates that the free trade network remains in place forever once attained. Alternatively, the sequence of transitions g ? ! g
CU ij
indicates the CU between i and j remains in place forever once formed.
14 In the background, a representative consumer has a quasi-linear utility function that is linear in a numeraire good and quadratic in the oligopolistic good. This implies linear demand for the oligopolistic good and that the numeraire good absorbs income e¤ects. The numeraire good balances trade across countries.
i's total pro…ts are i ( i ; j ; k ; g) = P j ij ( j ; g 
Moving beyond these cases, let v i ( i ; j ; k ; g) be country i's national welfare (i.e. the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and tari¤ revenue). Then, country i's optimal tari¤ given a network g is:
If country i has no PTA partners (i.e. i (g) = 1) then (1) reduces to
with the invariance of country i's optimal tari¤ to PTA formation by others stemming from the segmented nature of markets. However, country i's optimal tari¤ depends on its own PTA formation. If country i has one FTA partner (i.e. i (g) = 2) then (1) reduces to
In contrast to FTA members whose external tari¤s maximize their individual national welfare, CU members set a common external tari¤. I follow the standard approach in the literature (e.g. Saggi et al. (2013) ) where CU members do so by maximizing their joint welfare:
Comparing (3)- (4) with (2) reveals the well known phenomenon of "tari¤ complementarity" whereby, as in various other economic settings, PTA formation induces members to lower their external tari¤ of non-members (e.g. i (g ij ) < i (g ? )). Intuitively, in the oligopoly model, imperfect competition motivates governments to shift home market pro…ts from foreign …rms to domestic …rms by raising tari¤s. Indeed, this incentive strengthens with the home market's size. But, by increasing competition in the home market, FTA formation reduces the home …rm's markup in the home market. Thus, the home country's pro…t shifting motivation weakens and delivers tari¤ complementarity.
Importantly, the lower post-FTA tari¤ on the non-member not only shifts home market pro…ts from the home …rm to the non-member …rm but also from the foreign …rm of the new FTA partner country to the foreign non-member …rm. Thus, tari¤ complementarity creates a negative externality between FTA members. 15 However, CU formation allows members to internalize the negative externality via a common external tari¤. This coordination bene…t underlies why the CU optimal tari¤ exceeds the FTA optimal tari¤:
Nevertheless, CU members' ability to exploit the coordination bene…t is limited because WTO rules prevent CU members raising external tari¤s after CU formation. In the current oligopoly model, this constraint can only bind for the smaller CU insider j and does so when = 1:28. As such, this consideration places an upper bound on the degree of asymmetry allowed.
17 Denoting the largest country by l, and normalizing the market size of the smallest country to 1, I denote this threshold l and hereafter impose l < l . Naturally, the equilibrium path of PTA networks depends on PTA formation incentives and these depend on MFN tari¤s. For members, country i faces a bene…t and cost when forming a bilateral PTA. On one hand, country i bene…ts from tari¤ free access to country j's market. If the non-member k has no pre-existing PTA with country j, this tari¤ free access represents preferential access. If the non-member k has a pre-existing PTA with country j, this tari¤ free access eliminates pre-existing discrimination. On the other hand, the tari¤ free access that country i grants country j in country i's market represents the cost of a bilateral PTA for country i. In general, PTA formation also confers a bene…t and cost on the non-member. While the non-member bene…ts from any tari¤ complementarity, it also su¤ers from either discrimination or elimination of preferential access. Given these principles, …ve key properties drive the equilibrium structure.
Lemma 1 summarizes these …ve properties noting that, given optimal MFN tari¤s depend on the network g, v i ( i ; j ; k ; g) merely reduces to v i (g).
Lemma 1
The following properties characterize the myopic preferences of countries in the oligopoly model:
(i) Bilateral PTA formation is more attractive with a larger partner:
15 Estevadeordal et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence for tari¤ complementarity. 16 Formally, this inequality holds if and only if . The following analysis respects this constraint.
17 Like Missios et al. (2016) , the CU external tari¤ constraint plays little role here. Indeed, slightly relaxing this constraint (and imposing i g CU ij = i (g ? )), would leave the "large world" equilibrium structure in Figure 2 una¤ected and the "small world" equilibrium structure in Figure 3 would change only in that the F lex l ( l ) and F lex l ( l ) curves would kink at l = l . In contrast, see Mrázová et al. (2012) for an economic environment where the constraint can have non-trivial implications.
(ii) Except as an FTA outsider, all bilateral PTAs are mutually bene…cial for members:
Further, the CU outsider bene…ts from CU expansion:
. But, a CU insider i may hold a CU exclusion incentive against a CU outsider k only if it is larger than the CU outsider and this incentive is stronger for larger CU insiders:
Countries prefer being a CU insider than a CU outsider:
Further, when a large country j is an FTA insider, another country i prefers being an FTA insider over an FTA outsider:
The …rst two properties (mostly) describe member PTA formation incentives. Part (i) merely says that bilateral PTA formation is myopically more attractive with a larger partner. Intuitively, larger partners levy higher MFN tari¤s and thereby increase the value of tari¤ free access.
Despite the domestic market access given up, part (ii) says that bilateral PTA formation is myopically attractive with the only possible exception being FTA formation as an FTA outsider. Intuitively, an FTA outsider may refuse FTA formation with the FTA insiders because, the FTA outsider has already extracted market access gains via tari¤ complementarity. Nevertheless, the FTA outsider myopically bene…ts from subsequent FTA formation with an FTA insider once the FTA insider is su¢ ciently larger than the FTA outsider. Additionally, part (ii) says CU expansion always bene…ts the CU non-member. Intuitively, given the high MFN tari¤s imposed by CU insiders, the CU non-member bene…ts from eliminating the associated discrimination via CU expansion to global free trade.
The third property governs the myopic coordination bene…t of CUs. Speci…cally, because the MFN tari¤s of CU members internalize the negative externality associated with tari¤ complementarity, part (iii) says CU formation is myopically attractive relative to FTA formation.
The fourth property describes whether PTA insiders bene…t from excluding the PTA outsider from expansion to global free trade. In general, each PTA insider would gain tari¤ free access to the non-member's market. However, such access is not preferential access because both PTA insiders gain access, thereby diluting the bene…t. Moreover, through expansion, PTA insiders forego the reciprocal preferential access enjoyed as PTA insiders. Ultimately, part (iv) says that FTA insiders always bene…t from direct expansion to global free trade. That is, they never hold an FTA exclusion incentive. Conversely, part (iv) says that a larger CU insider may hold a CU exclusion incentive over a smaller CU outsider and this incentive strengthens with the size of the larger CU member. Intuitively, the myopic CU coordination bene…t strengthens the incentive of PTA insiders to bene…t from excluding the PTA outsider and su¢ ciently so that a larger CU insider may bene…t from permanently excluding a smaller CU outsider.
The …fth property governs the cost of being discriminated against as a PTA outsider. Because CU members internalize the negative externality associated with tari¤ complementarity, the CU outsider faces stronger discrimination than the FTA outsider. This intuition, coupled with the myopic CU coordination bene…t, underlies part (v) which says a country prefers being a CU insider rather than a CU outsider. Despite tari¤ complementarity mitigating the cost of discrimination as an FTA outsider, the degree of this discrimination rises with the market size of FTA insiders. Indeed, part (v) says that, …xing the largest country as an FTA insider, the discrimination faced as an FTA outsider is high enough that a country prefers being an FTA insider with the largest country than an FTA outsider.
Strategies and equilibrium concept
My dynamic model closely resembles Seidmann (2009). As described in Section 2.1, at most one agreement can form in any given period and agreements formed in previous periods are binding. Moreover, given a network at the end of the previous period g t 1 , I follow Seidmann (2009) and refer to the current period t as the subgame at g t 1 .
Seidmann (2009) assumes a stochastic protocol where a single "proposer" country can propose a trade agreement in a given period. However, I adopt a version of the deterministic protocol used by Lake and Yildiz (2016) . Letting l m s , two ideas underpin the protocol. First, like Aghion et al. (2007) , country l is the largest country and the "leader country" who has the …rst opportunity to propose PTA formation in each period. Second, unlike Aghion et al. (2007) , country m, who is the second largest country, becomes the proposer in a given period if country l does not have a proposal accepted by the "recipient" country or countries.
Formally, stages 1-2 below govern the protocol in each period. Naturally, a proposer country can only propose an agreement to which it is a member and that represents a feasible transition (see Table 1 ). To be clear, the proposer can propose no agreement and, following a proposal, a PTA forms if and only if all members of the proposed agreement accept.
Stage 1(a). Country l has the opportunity to propose a PTA. If an agreement forms then the period ends. If one recipient country rejects the proposal then the game moves to
; ij Stage 1(b). Country l has the opportunity to propose a PTA with the country who did not reject its proposal in stage 1(a). If the agreement forms then the period ends. Otherwise, the game moves to stage 2.
Stage 2. Country m has the opportunity to propose a PTA. Notice that the protocol implies that no further agreements form once no pair of countries want to form a subsequent agreement or upon attainment of the free trade network. Thus, no further agreements form after, at most, three periods.
As stated above, a proposer country can propose an agreement that has not yet formed and to which it will be a member. Table 2 illustrates the proposals available to each country in each possible subgame at network g; P i (g) represents this set of proposals and i (g) 2 P i (g) represents a proposal. In Table 2 , ij F T A and ij CU denote the FTA and CU between i and j while ijk CU denotes a three-country CU. denotes the proposer country's choice to make no proposal. Having received a proposal i (g), each recipient country j (i.e. a country of the proposed agreement) responds by announcing r j (g; i (g)) 2 fY; N g where Y (N ) denotes j accepts (does not accept) the proposal. Given the protocol, country i's Markov strategy must do two things for every subgame at network g: (i) assign a proposal i (g) 2 P i (g) for the stage where country i is the proposer and (ii) assign a response r i g; j (g) 2 fY; N g to any proposal country i may receive from another country j. I follow Seidmann (2009) and solve for a type of pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium. Speci…cally, I use backward induction to solve for a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium where the proposal by the proposer and the response(s) by the respondent(s) in period t only depend on history via the network g in place at the end of the previous period.
18 18 For convenience, I make two assumptions that restrict attention to certain Markov Perfect Equilibria. First, given the simultaneity of responses to a proposal for expansion of a CU to include the CU outsider, I assume countries respond to such proposals a¢ rmatively if they prefer global free trade over the status quo. That is, r h g
. I also assume a recipient country responds with r i g; j (g) = Y when responding with r i g; j (g) = N would merely delay formation of
Equilibrium path of networks
I now analyze the equilibrium path of PTA networks among asymmetric countries. To illustrate the impact of asymmetry, I follow Saggi et al. (2013) and consider two separate cases. Section 3.1 considers the "large world" case of two large countries and one small country, l = m > s 1. In this case, I relabel country l as country l 1 , who is the leader country in stage 1 of the protocol, and country m as country l 2 . Section 3.2 considers the "small world"case of one large country and two small countries, l > m = s . In this case, I relabel country m as s 1 , who is the proposer in stage 2 of the protocol, and country s as country s 2 . Comparing these two cases helps shed light on real world implications of the trade o¤ between the FTA ‡exibility and CU coordination bene…ts (Section 4.2 describes the additional insight from the general setting where m 2 [ s ; l ]). Note, when distinguishing between multiple large or small countries is irrelevant, I merely use l (instead of l 1 and l 2 ) or s (instead of s 1 and s 2 ).
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A cost of not focusing on a more general asymmetric structure is that the remaining partial degree of symmetry creates multiple equilibria. To avoid this complication in the large world case of Section 3.1, I assume country s derives some arbitrarily small non-economic bene…t > 0 when forming a bilateral PTA with country l 1 . Thus, despite equal economic attractiveness, country s views country l 1 as a more attractive partner than l 2 . Analogously in the small world case of Section 3.2, I assume country l derives some arbitrarily small noneconomic bene…t > 0 when forming a bilateral PTA with country s 1 so that country l views country s 1 a more attractive partner than s 2 .
20 Indeed, these non-economic bene…ts can be motivated as explaining why country l 1 (s 1 ) moves before country l 2 (s 2 ) in the protocol of Section 3.1 (Section 3.2). Moreover, this approach would be essentially identical to saying that country l 1 (s 1 ) had a slightly larger market size than l 2 (s 2 ) in the large (small) world case of Section 3.1 (Section 3.2). A corollary from taking this perspective is that the equilibrium outcome in the symmetric case where l = m = s is merely the limiting case of both the large world analysis and the small world analysis as l ! s . In the former case, this is achieved through l 1 and l 2 deriving some arbitrarily small non-economic bene…t > 0 when forming a bilateral PTA with each other so that they view this PTA as more attractive than a PTA with s even though l = s . In the latter case, this is achieved through s 1 and s 2 deriving some arbitrarily small the proposed agreement to a later stage of the current period. This can be motivated by the presence of an arbitrarily small cost involved in making a response. 19 In the Appendix, ( l ; m ; s ). 20 To be clear, the one period payo¤s v i (g) and the continuation payo¤s V i (g) are de…ned excluding these non-economic bene…ts.
non-economic bene…t > 0 when forming a bilateral PTA with l so that they view the PTA with l as more attractive than a PTA between themselves even though l = s . Indeed, the y-axis of Figures 2-4 in Sections 3.1-3.3 depict the equilibrium path of networks for a symmetric three country world.
The subsequent analysis in the "large world"and "small world"cases proceeds by backward induction. Remember, global free trade remains forever once attained. Thus, the backward induction begins by considering the equilibrium outcome in subgames at hubspoke networks. Given the equilibrium transitions from hub-spoke networks, the analysis then rolls backward and considers the equilibrium outcome in subgames at FTA insideroutsider networks. Before rolling back to consider the equilibrium outcome in the subgame at the empty network, the analysis considers the equilibrium outcome of subgames at CU insider-outsider networks. Given the equilibrium transitions from the FTA and CU insideroutsider networks, the analysis then rolls back and considers the equilibrium outcome at the empty network. The equilibrium transition from the empty network together with the subsequent equilibrium transitions reveals the equilibrium path of networks.
A "large" world: two large countries and one small country
With the equilibrium transitions in place from hub-spoke as well as CU and FTA insideroutsider networks (Sections 3.1.1-3.1.2), the key trade o¤ underlying the equilibrium path of networks emerges which is the trade o¤ between the CU coordination bene…ts and the FTA ‡exibility bene…t (Section 3.1.3).
Subgames at hub-spoke networks
To begin, consider the subgame at a hub-spoke network g H i . As described in Section 2.2, spokes always bene…t from exchanging reciprocal preferential access and forming the …nal FTA that leads to global free trade. Thus, from any hub-spoke network g H i , the equilibrium transition is g
Subgames at FTA and CU insider-outsider networks
Now roll back to the subgame at an FTA insider-outsider network g
. While an FTA insider always wants to become the hub, an FTA outsider may refuse an FTA with either FTA insider which leaves the FTA insider-outsider network g F T A ij in place permanently. Myopic and farsighted incentives motivate an FTA insider's desire to become the hub. As described in Section 2.2, preferential market access to the FTA outsider's market makes becoming the hub myopically attractive:
. In principle, an FTA insider may have a farsighted incentive to refuse becoming the hub because it subsequently loses preferential access in both spoke markets when the spokes form their own FTA. However, as described in Section 2.2, FTA insiders do not hold FTA exclusion incentives:
. Thus, from myopic and farsighted perspectives, FTA insiders want to become the hub. Further, as described in Section 2.2, the FTA outsider prefers FTA formation with the larger FTA insider. Thus, in equilibrium, the more attractive FTA insider becomes the hub whenever the FTA outsider willingly participates in FTA formation.
Unlike FTA insiders, the FTA outsider may face a tension between myopic and farsighted incentives for subsequent FTA formation. As discussed in Section 2.2, the FTA outsider bene…ts from tari¤ complementarity whereby FTA insiders lower their MFN tari¤s upon FTA formation. Thus, despite the discrimination faced because FTA insiders enjoy reciprocal tari¤ free access, the FTA outsider has already gained tari¤ concessions from FTA members. As such, the FTA outsider may not bene…t myopically from becoming a spoke:
can hold. Nevertheless, even in this case, an FTA outsider can bene…t from removing the discrimination faced in both FTA insider markets:
. Thus, given spokes always form spoke-spoke FTAs, an FTA outsider can have a farsighted incentive to become a spoke even though it may not have a myopic incentive.
Naturally, the discount factor mediates the myopic and farsighted incentives of the FTA outsider's decision regarding subsequent FTA formation. An FTA outsider i wants to become a spoke with the more attractive FTA insider j if and only if
Thus, an FTA outsider wants to become the spoke only when it is su¢ ciently patient that the farsighted incentive to become the spoke outweighs the myopic incentive to remain an FTA outsider. Because FTA insiders always want to become the hub and spokes always form their own FTA, this trade o¤ for the FTA outsider determines whether an FTA insider-outsider remains permanently or leads to global free trade via the hub-spoke network. In contrast to subsequent FTA formation at an FTA insider-outsider network, subsequent CU formation at a CU insider-outsider network does not depend on a tension between myopic and farsighted incentives. As described in Section 2.2, a CU outsider faces strong discrimination given CU insiders internalize the negative externality associated with tari¤ complementarity. Thus, a CU outsider always favors CU expansion which, by construction, leads directly to global free trade. But, as described in Section 2.2, a large country may bene…t from permanently excluding the CU outsider from CU expansion. Indeed, a large country holds a CU exclusion incentive against the smallest country under su¢ cient asym-
In this case, the relatively large market size of the CU insiders raises their MFN tari¤s su¢ ciently that the market access provided by CU expansion with country s cannot compensate country l for its lost preferential market access with country m. Thus, ultimately, CU expansion takes place after two large countries form a CU if and only if l < (ii) Consider a CU insider-outsider network g CU ij . This CU insider-outsider network does not expand, and thereby remains permanently, if it involves the largest country and the largest country holds a CU exclusion incentive against the CU outsider. Otherwise, the CU insider-outsider network expands to include the third country (which is equivalent to global free trade).
Subgame at empty network
Now, roll back to the empty network. Keeping in mind the equilibrium transitions from PTA insider-outsider networks described in Lemma 2, knowing the PTA outcome at the empty network reveals the equilibrium path of networks. Given the attractiveness of the large leader country l 1 , the equilibrium path of networks revolves around its preference for exploiting the FTA ‡exibility or CU coordination bene…t.
Nevertheless, l 1 cannot merely impose its will on others. Given l 2 cannot become the hub after FTA formation with l 1 , the coordination bene…ts of CU formation imply l 2 prefers a CU rather than an FTA with l 1 . But, suppose l 1 wants to form an FTA with country l 2 to exploit the FTA ‡exibility bene…t whereby l 1 then becomes the hub on the path to global free trade. The protocol says that l 2 can reject l 1 's FTA proposal and thereby force l 1 to propose PTA formation with country s (and, if that fails, l 2 can then propose PTA formation itself). Thus, to induce l 2 's acceptance of its FTA proposal, l 1 must be able to threaten l 2 that it would prefer an FTA with s over a CU with l 2 . 21 In this case, l 2 will accept an FTA proposal from l 1 to avoid being an FTA outsider on the path to global free trade. Otherwise, facing a credible threat of l 2 rejecting its FTA proposal, l 1 cedes and proposes a CU with l 2 .
21 Note, l 1 always prefers CU formation with l 2 over CU formation with s.
Formally, l 1 prefers FTA formation with s over CU formation with l 2 when
If the large countries do not hold a CU exclusion incentive, their CU expands directly to global free trade. Then, (5) says the FTA ‡exibility bene…t for a large country of being an FTA insider with country s outweighs the CU coordination bene…t from being a CU insider with the other large country when
(6) Because CU and FTA formation eventually yield global free trade, the myopic CU coordination and FTA ‡exibility bene…ts derive from the di¤erent paths to global free trade. With a su¢ ciently high discount factor, the FTA ‡exibility bene…t outweighs the myopic CU coordination bene…t and l 1 prefers FTA formation with s over CU formation with l 2 .
The FTA ‡exibility bene…t for l 1 is that it becomes the hub after being an FTA insider rather than moving to directly to global free trade as would happen from CU expansion after being a CU insider. That is, the FTA ‡exibility bene…t captures the ability of FTA insiders to subsequently form their own individual FTAs. Moreover, this ‡exibility is valuable, v l 1 g H l 1
v l 1 g F T > 0, because the hub enjoys reciprocal tari¤ free preferential market access with both spoke countries while the spokes face MFN tari¤s with each other. The myopic CU coordination bene…t is merely the one period bene…t l 1 derives from CU formation with l 2 over FTA formation with s.
this myopic CU coordination bene…t derives from (i) the ability of large CU members to coordinate external trade policy and thereby internalize the negative externality associated with tari¤ complementarity,
> 0, and (ii) the ability to engage in PTA formation with a larger partner, v l 1 g
A CU exclusion incentive between the large countries modi…es the trade o¤ between the FTA ‡exibility and CU coordination bene…ts. Now (5) says the FTA ‡exibility bene…t for a large country of being an FTA insider with country s outweighs the CU coordination bene…t from being a CU insider with the other large country when
, 2
Now, the CU coordination bene…t consists of a myopic and farsighted component. This farsighted component is the joint authority motive and represents the bene…t of eliminating the possibility that either CU insider can become the hub and precipitate global free trade which is what would happen if the countries engaged in FTA formation. Thus, when the large countries hold a CU exclusion incentive, the CU coordination bene…t outweighs the FTA ‡exibility for su¢ ciently myopic or su¢ ciently farsighted countries.
With the trade o¤ between the FTA ‡exibility bene…t and CU coordination bene…ts in place, Proposition 1 now describes the equilibrium path of networks in the large world of two large countries and one small country. Note that, for compactness, one can rewrite
Proposition 1 Consider a "large world" with two large countries and one small country,
F lex l ( l ) , the equilibrium path of networks is that the large countries form an FTA and then country l 1 becomes the hub on the path to global free trade. If = 2
F lex l ( l ) , the equilibrium path of networks is that the large countries form a CU which then expands to global free trade if and only if the large countries do not hold a CU exclusion incentive. Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1. First, suppose l < CU l 1:14 s so that the large countries do not hold a CU exclusion incentive. As such, a CU between the large countries expands to global free trade. When > F lex l ( l ), both large countries prefer an FTA with country s over a CU with each other. In this case, the future ‡exibility bene…t for a large country of becoming the hub after being an FTA insider with s outweighs the myopic CU coordination bene…t of internalizing the tari¤ complementarity negative externality via CU formation with the other large country. Thus, l 2 cannot credibly threaten to reject an FTA with l 1 (in stage 1(a)) because l 1 would then form an FTA with s (in stage 1(b)) rather than witness an FTA between l 2 and s (in stage 2). Indeed, given the market size of l 2 makes it a more attractive FTA partner than s, l 1 proposes an FTA with l 2 when > F lex l ( l ) and l 2 accepts.
22 Thus, the equilibrium path of networks is g ? ! g
22 Note that max
However, once < F lex l ( l ) then both large countries prefer CU formation with each other over FTA formation with s. Thus, even if l 1 would prefer FTA over CU formation with l 2 , l 2 can credibly threaten to refuse an FTA with l 1 because l 1 would prefer to wait for a CU proposal from l 2 (in stage 2) rather than form an FTA with s (in stage 1(b)). Hence, the equilibrium path of networks is g ? ! g
Second, suppose l > CU l so that a CU between the large countries does not expand to include the small country because of their CU exclusion incentive. Similar intuition again explains the equilibrium. The main di¤erence is that the CU exclusion incentive provides a farsighted component to the CU coordination bene…t. The CU exclusion incentive, i.e.
implies countries value CU formation eliminating the possibility that either FTA insider can become the hub and precipitate global free trade. Thus, l 1 only prefers an FTA with s over a CU with l 2 when 2
where, now,
As such, the equilibrium path of networks is g ? ! g Figure 2 describe whether PTA formation takes the form of FTAs or CUs for a given value of asymmetry l , it also describes how the type of PTA formation changes as asymmetry grows. Indeed, rising asymmetry reduces the range of the discount factor where FTA formation takes place. When the large countries have no CU exclusion incentive, i.e. l < CU l , this is because the myopic CU coordination bene…t strengthens relative to the FTA ‡exibility bene…t. On one hand, the FTA ‡exibility bene…t, i.e. v l 1 g
respectively, from the subgames at g sl and g ll once >
strengthens because, as the hub, l 1 has sole preferential access with l 2 and this becomes more valuable as l rises. But, on the other hand, the myopic CU coordination bene…t, i.e.
strengthens even more as l rises. First, the bene…t of forming a PTA with l 2 rather than s becomes more valuable. Second, the bene…t l 1 and l 2 derive from their CU internalizing the negative externality of tari¤ complementarity becomes more valuable. Thus, F lex l ( l ) slopes upward in Figure 2 . Once the large countries have a CU exclusion incentive, an additional force reduces the extent of FTA formation. Indeed, FTA formation no longer exists shortly after l exceeds CU l . The CU exclusion incentive strengthens as l rises because the higher degree of preferential access protected as CU insiders makes giving further tari¤ free access more costly. In turn, this adds further incentive for CU formation over FTA formation for the large country l 1 and and
3.2 A "small" world: two small countries and one large country
To illustrate how the structure of asymmetry a¤ects whether FTAs or CUs emerge in equilibrium, I now consider the "small world"case with two small countries and one large country. That is, s 2 = s 1 = l < l . 23 3.2.1 Subgames at hub-spoke networks and FTA and CU insider outsider networks
As noted immediately prior to its presentation, Lemma 2 describes the equilibrium transitions conditional on an initial PTA in both the large world and the small world case. First, spokes form the …nal FTA leading to global free trade. Second, an FTA insider-outsider network g
F T A ij
expands to global free trade via the hub-spoke network with the more attractive FTA insider i as the hub when > OU T k;i ( l ) but, otherwise, the FTA outsider rejects subsequent FTA formation. Third, a CU insider-outsider network g CU ij expands to include the CU outsider unless the large country holds a CU exclusion incentive which it does once l > CU l .
Subgame at empty network
Rolling back to the subgame at the empty network, the FTA ‡exibility and CU coordination bene…ts for the large country l still drive the equilibrium structure. Similar to before, inducing s 1 's acceptance of its FTA proposal requires l threaten s 1 that it prefers an FTA 23 l < l = 1:28 ensures a CU between the large and the small country does not lead to external tari¤s that violate the GATT Article XXIV constraint that members not raise tari¤s on non-members.
with s 2 over a CU with s 1 . 24 In this case, s 1 will accept the FTA proposal from l to avoid being an FTA outsider on the path to global free trade. Otherwise, facing a credible threat of s 1 rejecting its FTA proposal, l cedes and proposes a CU with s 1 . Formally, l prefers an FTA with s 2 over a CU with s 1 when V l g
When the large country does not have a CU exclusion incentive then CU expansion takes place and
When the large country holds a CU exclusion incentive, V l g
Again, the trade-o¤ depends on the FTA ‡exibility bene…t versus the CU coordination bene…t with the CU coordination bene…t consisting of a myopic component and, in the presence of a CU exclusion incentive, a farsighted component. With the FTA ‡exibility and CU coordination bene…ts in place, Proposition 2 describes the equilibrium. To streamline the analysis, Proposition 2 restricts attention to discount factors below a threshold ( l ) once l > CU l . This condition ensures that, when the large country has a CU exclusion incentive, the small country s 1 prefers a CU with the large country l rather than an FTA with l or a CU with the other small country s 2 . 25 Nevertheless, I discuss the equilibrium path of networks when > ( l ) and > CU l before moving on to the next subsection.
Proposition 2 Consider a "small world" with two small countries and one large country,
F lex l ( l ) , the equilibrium path of networks is that the large country and the small country s 1 form an FTA and then the large country becomes the hub on the path to global free trade. If = 2
F lex l ( l ) , the equilibrium path of networks is that the 24 Note, l always prefers CU formation with s 1 over CU formation with s 2 given the non-economic bene…t of PTA formation with s 1 . 25 As shown in Figure 3 below, ( l ) increases from 0:89 when l = CU l to 0:97 when l = l . In the general case where m 2 [ s ; l ], the restriction imposed < ( l ) is indeed tightest in the small world case of m = s . large country and the small country s 1 form a CU which then expands to global free trade if and only if the large country does not hold a CU exclusion incentive. Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 2. First, suppose l < CU l 1:21 s so that the large country does not hold a CU exclusion incentive. Then, the CU between the large country l and the small country s 1 expands to global free trade. But, when > F lex l ( l ), l prefers an FTA with s 2 over a CU with s 1 because the future ‡exibility bene…t of FTA formation that allows l 1 to become the hub outweighs the myopic CU coordination bene…t that allows l and s 1 to internalize the negative externality from tari¤ complementarity. Thus, l can threaten an FTA with s 2 to induce s 1 's acceptance of an FTA proposal. In turn, l proposes an FTA with s 1 when > F lex l ( l ) and s 1 accepts. 26 Thus, the equilibrium path of networks is
( l ) then l prefers CU formation over FTA formation and the equilibrium path of networks is g ? ! g
Second, suppose l > CU l so that a CU involving the large country does not expand to include the small CU outsider because of the large country's CU exclusion incentive. This CU exclusion incentive, i.e. v l g CU sl > v l g F T , provides a farsighted component to the CU coordination bene…t because CU formation eliminates the possibility that either FTA insider can become the hub and precipitate global free trade. Thus, l only prefers FTA formation over CU formation when 2
where, now, F lex l ( l ) < 1. As such, the equilibrium path of networks is g ? ! g
F lex l ( l ) . Not only does Figure 3 describe whether PTA formation takes the form of FTAs or CUs for a given value of asymmetry l , it also describes how the type of PTA formation changes as asymmetry grows. Like Figure 2 , rising asymmetry reduces the range of the discount factor where FTA formation takes place although for slightly di¤erent reasons. Because the large country's bene…t of being the hub stems from sole preferential access to each of the small spoke countries, this bene…t is independent of l . However, the myopic CU coordination bene…t still rises with l . Nevertheless, this bene…t no longer consists of a part stemming from PTA formation with a larger partner as in Figure 2 . Rather, it entirely revolves around tari¤ complementarity. Because CU members set a common MFN tari¤ that partly re ‡ects each country's tari¤ preference, the common MFN tari¤ depends on the market size of both countries. This contrasts with FTA formation where the MFN tari¤ only depends on a country's own market size. In turn, as l rises, the degree of tari¤ complementarity practiced by s 1 (l) falls (rises) under a CU relative to an FTA. As such, the myopic CU coordination 26 Note that ( l ) slopes upward. Once the large country has a CU exclusion incentive, an additional force reduces the extent of FTA formation. By increasing the cost of giving further tari¤ free access, the CU exclusion incentive strengthens as l rises. In turn, this adds further incentive for CU formation over FTA formation for the large country and F lex l ( l ) slopes downward. In the following subsection, I discuss the important di¤erences in the equilibrium structure between the small world case of Figure 3 and the large world case of Figure 2 , and describe how this sheds some light on real world PTA negotiations. But, before doing so, I discuss the equilibrium path of networks in the shaded area of Figure 3 where > ( l ) and > CU l which was ignored in Proposition 2. Once l > CU l , the large country has a CU exclusion incentive and a CU involving the large country will not expand to global free trade. Here, the equilibrium becomes tedious once > ( l ). First, consider su¢ ciently high and l only somewhat above CU l . Then, the small countries prefer a CU with each other over any other PTA as a means to attain tari¤ free access to the large country via CU expansion to global free trade and do so without facing discrimination as a spoke. As such, the equilibrium path of networks would be g ? ! g CU ss ! g F T . Second, for su¢ ciently high and l su¢ ciently above CU l , s 1 prefers an FTA with l over any other PTA because (i) preferential access to l's market is quite valuable and (ii) FTA formation eventually yields global free trade and it does not hold a CU exclusion incentive. If l also prefers FTA over CU formation with s 1 , i.e. 2 F lex l
F lex l ( l ) , the equilibrium path of networks is g ? ! g
But, l prefers CU formation when = 2
F lex l ( l ) . Now, the equilibrium outcome depends on whether s 2 prefers being a permanent CU insider with l or being discriminated against as an FTA outsider and a spoke on the path to global free trade. Because s 2 does not hold a CU exclusion incentive, the answer is the latter when is su¢ ciently high, leading to 
Real world implications
Given the equilibrium characterization illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 , Figure 4 compares whether FTA or CU formation takes place. For example, in the upper left region, "2L: FTA" denotes that FTA formation takes place in the large world case with two large countries and one small country while "2S: FTA" denotes that FTA formation takes place in the small world case with two small countries and one large country. Figure 4 shows that, indeed, the type of PTA takes the same form across three of the four regions of the parameter space. However, PTAs take di¤erent forms across the small and large worlds in the middle shaded area: FTA formation in the small world but CU formation in the large world. Moreover, for the most part, once l lies between the threshold values of CU l for the two worlds, CU formation emerges regardless of the discount factor in the 27 s 1 rather than s 2 becomes the PTA insider in equilibrium because l prefers s 1 as its PTA insider partner and s 1 accepts anticipating that s 2 would accept if s 1 rejected. large world whereas FTA formation emerges in the small world once exceeds
Here, the FTA ‡exibility bene…t cannot outweigh the CU coordination bene…ts in the large world but does outweigh the CU coordination bene…t in the small world. Thus, the trade o¤ between the FTA ‡exibility and CU coordination bene…ts drives the prevalence of FTAs in the small world relative to the large world.
Naturally, given the stylized nature of the model, real world implications should be interpreted with care. Nevertheless, with this in mind, I now describe how these insights could potentially help rationalize that MERCOSUR is a CU (consisting of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and, now, Venezuela) while the Andean Community is an FTA (consisting of Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia). For this purpose, I view the decision whether MERCOSUR should be an FTA or CU as decided by the dominant and largest members Brazil and Argentina and the analogous decision for the Andean Community as one decided by the dominant and largest members Colombia and Peru.
Two observations immediately jump out when looking at MERCOSUR. First, the only agreement noti…ed to the WTO by MERCOSUR is an agreement with India and this agreement actually falls outside the scope of Article XXIV (formed under the Enabling Clause of GATT). That is, according to the WTO, MERCOSUR has not formed any Article XXIV FTAs or CUs with other countries. Second, given their economic size and strong bilateral trade linkages, Brazil and Argentina likely view each other as relatively attractive partners vis a vis non-MERCOSUR countries. These observations suggest two possible reasons for the CU nature of MERCOSUR. First, even if Argentina or Brazil wanted MERCOSUR as an FTA, the threat of this FTA proponent forming an FTA with a non-MERCOSUR country so the other would accept a MERCOSUR FTA would likely be non-credible. Second, Argentina and Brazil could hold a CU exclusion incentive and are su¢ ciently farsighted that the joint authority motive of a CU outweighs any possible FTA ‡exibility bene…t. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that, at various points in time, Brazil or Argentina have exploited their joint authority motive to halt possible FTA negotiations desired by the other that could have plausibly moved ahead on a bilateral basis if MERCOSUR was an FTA.
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Looking at the Andean Community (CAN), Two contrasting observations immediately jump out. First, apart from CAN itself, Colombia and Peru have noti…ed the WTO of, respectively, eight and twelve FTAs under Article XXIV. Thus, the ‡exibility bene…t of FTAs appears rather valuable for Colombia and/or Peru. Second, given their size and far weaker bilateral trade linkages than between Brazil and Argentina, Colombia and Peru plausibly view each other as not much more attractive partners than many non-CAN countries. Klom (2003, p.362) , Osthus (2013, pp.36-41, 49-64) Thus, the Swiss desire for the ‡exibility bene…ts of FTAs combined with a plausibly credible threat of abandoning EFTA and pursuing FTAs with non-EFTA states could help rationalize the FTA nature of EFTA.
Finally, how does the trade o¤ between the FTA ‡exibility and CU coordination bene…ts inform the fact that the 1989 US-Canada bilateral FTA set the US on a path devoid of CUs? Given the sheer economic size of the US relative to Canada, the US-Canada relationship …ts closer to the small world case of one large and two small countries rather than the large world case of two large and one small country. Thus, as the leader country, it is likely the US could credibly commit to begin FTA formation with other countries if Canada insisted on a bilateral CU. Thus, the bilateral US-Canada FTA could indicate the value placed on the FTA ‡exibility bene…t by the US. Indeed, Figure 5 shows that the US became the hub when thinking of the third small country as either Australia, Colombia or Korea. And, in the latter two cases, the spoke countries then formed their own FTA. The …gure also shows a similar story with respect to either the US and Australia being FTA insiders and Korea being the third country or the US and Mexico being FTA insiders and Peru or "Central America"being the third country. The …rst important observation is that the myopic PTA formation incentives described in Section 2.2 under the oligopoly model also hold in the competing exporters model with symmetric market size (see Lemma 4 in the Appendix). In turn, these properties also hold with su¢ ciently small degrees of asymmetric market size. This is not to say that a su¢ ciently small degree of asymmetry is a necessary condition for the myopic PTA formation incentives, only that it is a su¢ cient condition. Thus, Propositions 1-2 describe the equilibrium path of networks in the large and small world case for su¢ ciently small l .
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The key di¤erence between Figures 2 and 3 highlighted by Figure 4 is that the extent of FTA formation is larger in the small world case than the large world case. Indeed, the second important observation is that this remains true in the competing exporters model as one moves away from symmetry. In terms of Figures 2 and 3 Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and has been used in the PTA literature by, e.g., Saggi and Yildiz (2011) . 33 See the Appendix for welfare expressions and optimal MFN tari¤s. 34 In the oligopoly model, Propositions 1-2 rely on Lemmas 1-3 in the Appendix. For the competing exporters model, Lemma 4 veri…es Lemmas 1-3. the di¤erence between the large and small world cases actually becomes even starker.
Two observations explain the greater extent of FTA formation in the small world case relative to the large world case. First, as in the oligopoly model when the leader country i is negotiating initial PTA formation with the second most attractive country j and pushing for FTA rather than CU formation, the small world with j = s 1 and s 2 as small countries lends added credibility to l's threat of forming an FTA with s 2 . Second, the impact of a rising l on the relative degree of tari¤ complementarity under a small-large CU versus a small-large FTA is opposite to that in the oligopoly model small world case. There, a rising l bene…tted the large country by increasing the degree of tari¤ complementarity practised by itself relative to the small country. However, here, the opposite holds. Now, a higher l increases the value for s 1 of mitigating tari¤ complementarity practised by l market and, given no domestic production by l, the optimal CU tari¤ of l rises which hurts l by moving further from its individually optimal FTA tari¤. Moreover, a higher l now reduces l's exports to s 1 and thereby reduces the value for l of mitigating tari¤ complementarity practised by s 1 . By lowering the optimal CU tari¤ of s 1 and the preferential margin, this hurts l. Together, these two observations not only ‡atten F lex l ( l ) in the small world relative to the large world but actually change its shape from upward to downward sloping.
Generalizing beyond "large" and "small" worlds
Despite the parameter l capturing the relative size of the largest to the smallest country, the small and large world cases are two extremes where the market size of the "medium" country equals that of either the large or small country (i.e. m = l or m = s ). Indeed, the proof for the equilibrium path of networks in the large and small worlds, i.e. Propositions 1-2, are merely special cases of the more general proof for the equilibrium path of networks where m 2 [ s ; l ] contained in Propositions 3-4 of the Appendix. Intuitively, one would expect the upper left region of Figure 4 , where FTAs emerge in either the small or large world, to expand out as m falls from m = l and fully engulf the shaded middle area once m = s . Indeed, despite one complication, the logic of the baseline analysis validates this intuition.
The additional complication in the general asymmetric world stems from the following situation. Suppose country l holds a CU exclusion incentive when country s is the CU outsider, so that the CU between countries m and l does not expand. On one hand, relative to a CU with m, l may not want to form an FTA with s even though it wants to form an FTA with country m. On the other hand, m may prefer an FTA with s rather than a CU with l. This latter observation implies m cannot credibly reject an FTA with l (in stage 1(a)) because l will then propose an FTA with s (in stage 1(b)) rather than witness an FTA between s and m (in stage 2). As such, m will accept an FTA from l (in stage 1(a)) even though l does not prefer FTA formation with s over CU formation with m (i.e. < l ( l )).
In the large world case, m would not accept such an FTA. But this was because m could credibly commit to proposing a CU with l rather than an FTA with s (in stage 2) and it cannot do so in the situation described here. Ultimately, the constraint for l to impose FTA formation on m in the general asymmetric world is slightly relaxed in a particular situation.
Nevertheless, the key idea conveyed in the earlier analysis of the large and small worlds applies in the general asymmetric world. Speci…cally, the large country's ability to exploit the FTA ‡exibility bene…t as the hub with the "medium" country increases as the medium country becomes smaller. Intuitively, this shrinks the relative attractiveness of the medium country and increases the credibility of the large country threatening an FTA with the small country as a means to induce the medium country's acceptance of FTA formation.
Incorporating multilateral negotiations
To focus on the trade-o¤ between the FTA ‡exibility and CU coordination bene…ts, the possibility of multilateral negotiations, including a direct move to global free trade via zero tari¤s, was assumed away. Indeed, this matches the contrast between the extraordinary proliferation of PTAs since the mid 1990s and the complete failure of the current Doha round of multilateral negotiations. Nevertheless, with some minor modi…cations, my main results are quite robust to allowing multilateral negotiations. Moreover, doing so helps link the analysis to the recent literature on the role of PTAs as building blocs or stumbling blocs to global free trade (e.g., Saggi and Yildiz (2010) , Saggi et al. (2013) and Lake (2017) ).
To model multilateral negotiations, suppose each period has a stage 0 where countries sequentially announce whether they want to participate in multilateral negotiations. If all countries announce in favor, multilateral negotiations take place with the outcome being the tari¤ vector that maximizes the three-country joint government payo¤ subject to any zero tari¤s associated with pre-existing PTAs. 35, 36 That is, multilateral negotiations determine MFN tari¤s. Regardless of whether multilateral negotiations take place in stage 0, countries then have the opportunity to form PTAs in stages 1-2 as in earlier sections. Nevertheless, in equilibrium, multilateral negotiations play no meaningful role after an initial PTA. Note that, whenever they take place, multilateral negotiations yield global free trade because this maximizes world welfare. But, regardless of multilateral negotiations, any CU expansion leads directly to global free trade. Further, the FTA insider-turned-hub would block multilateral negotiations either at the FTA insider-outsider network or the hub-spoke network to protect the sole preferential access it enjoys, albeit temporarily, as the hub. Do multilateral negotiations take place prior to any PTAs having formed? If there exists a CU exclusion incentive, the answer is no. When the CU coordination bene…t dominates the FTA ‡exibility bene…t, CU insiders block multilateral negotiations, becoming permanent CU insiders. When the FTA ‡exibility bene…t dominates the CU coordination bene…t, the FTA insider-turned-hub blocks multilateral negotiations, becoming the hub on the path to global free trade. However, multilateral negotiations take place in the absence of a CU exclusion incentive if V l g F T > V l (g jl ) which reduces to
When >~ ( l ), there is su¢ cient weight on the FTA ‡exibility bene…t, and the sole preferential access to each spoke country as the hub, that the FTA insider-turned-hub blocks multilateral negotiations and becomes the FTA insider-turned-hub on the path to global free trade. But, multilateral negotiations take place when <~ ( l ), generating global free trade. Unlike CU expansion which leads directly to global free trade, FTA expansion in earlier sections had to proceed via a hub-spoke network even though, in principle, FTA insiders and the FTA outsider could form a trilateral FTA leading directly to global free trade. But, above, multilateral negotiations always lead to global free trade and were allowed to take place in every period, including at the FTA insider-outsider network. That is, the modeling of multilateral negotiations allowed countries to move directly from an FTA insider-outsider network to global free trade. This move is equivalent to the FTA insiders and the FTA outsider forming a trilateral FTA. Nevertheless, as described above, the insider-turned-hub would always block such trilateral FTA negotiations. Further, the veto power wielded by each country, and the insider-turned-hub in particular, in these trilateral FTA negotiations matches the situation of CU expansion where such expansion takes place if and only if all countries agree. Thus, the main results in earlier sections remain when allowing trilateral FTA negotiations that require the consent of all countries.
A many country world
As with nearly all of the PTA literature, my analysis considered three countries.
37 Nevertheless, how would the insights discussed above materialize in a many country world? In a three country world, the insider-turned-spoke did not bene…t from the FTA ‡exibility bene…t. Rather, it su¤ered from the ‡exibility of FTAs. However, this would not necessarily happen in a many country world. While Figure 5 highlights how, in a many country world, the US has emerged as the hub in various di¤erent contexts, this has not happened exclusively. Indeed, one would expect that certain countries make "natural"trading partners for various economic and non-economic reasons. For example, many Asian nations could make natural trading partners for Australia. Indeed, Australia implemented FTAs with China and Japan in 2015 making Australia the "hub"country between these Asian powers and the US. Further, Australia is currently negotiating FTAs with Asian developing country powerhouses Indonesia and India. Similarly, Canada has an FTA with EFTA, has signed an FTA with the EU and is currently in negotiations with Japan. In all these cases, Canada would be the "hub" between these countries and the US. Ultimately, the FTA ‡exibility bene…t can be shared between FTA partners in a many country world.
A many country world can also make the joint authority motive of CU more valuable. In the formal analysis earlier, the CU coordination and FTA ‡exibility bene…ts were distinct. But, as alluded to in Section 3.3, the FTA ‡exibility and CU coordination bene…ts can interact in a many country world. There, I discussed how the joint authority motive potentially made the EU CU attractive given the complex web of bilateral rates of preferential access that could have emerged if EU members started forming their own individual FTAs with non-EU countries. Nevertheless, most of the EUs subsequent PTAs have been FTAs (e.g. EFTA, Canada, Mexico and Korea).
38 Indeed, from a purely economic perspective, having the ‡exibility to form further PTAs without requiring the consent of these FTA partners probably meant having the PTA as a CU was never seriously considered. Thus, a many country world creates interesting interactions between the CU coordination and FTA ‡exibility bene…ts.
Length of FTA negotiations
An important presumption underlying typical dynamic models of PTA formation is an exogenous time lag between beginning PTA negotiations and PTA implementation. Absent such a time lag, countries should form PTAs immediately upon the opportunity arising rather than waiting. For example, given spokes always bene…t from FTA formation in my model, spokes would form their FTA immediately upon the emergence of the hub-spoke network which, in turn, would wipe away the FTA ‡exibility bene…t. Nevertheless, academic empirical evidence and real world policy discussions recognize the substantial time requirement surrounding PTA formation. For US FTAs, Freund and McDaniel (2016) document an average of 1.5 years from launching negotiations to signing an FTA and 3.75 years from launching negotiations to PTA implementation. Looking at over 120 FTAs, Mölders (2012) and Mölders (2015) document an average of 3.6 years from beginning negotiations to PTA implementation (3.25 years for bilateral FTAs). Thus, considerable time elapses between the start of PTA negotiations and PTA implementation.
Successful PTA formation requires substantial diplomatic resources. Real world PTAs involve negotiations over phase-out periods for tari¤s and non-tari¤ barriers at the productlevel as well as product-level rules of origin. Typically, they also involve negotiations over other complex issues including labor and environmental provisions, public procurement, services, state aid, competition policy, intellectual property rights and investment (Kohl et al. (2016) ). Thus, countries require skilled and experienced negotiators familiar with the speci…c wants and concerns of domestic interest groups and bureaucrats who understand how to implement and follow the PTA. This can not only be challenging for developing countries (Dent (2006) ) but also developed countries like the US. Indeed, US Government Accountability O¢ ce (2004, p.3, p.27 ) document that, due to their high diplomatic-resource intensity, FTA negotiations strain USTR (United States Trade Representative) and other agencies'resources and these resource constraints actually in ‡uence FTA partner selection.
Conclusion
Since the early 1990s, the number of PTAs has expanded exponentially. However, while some in ‡uential PTAs are CUs, the vast majority are FTAs. This is surprising given that CU members coordinate on common external tari¤s. Indeed, dating back to Kennan and Riezman (1990) , the literature recognizes this coordination bene…t of CUs with Facchini et al. (2012, p.136) Recent papers have examined broad notions of ‡exibility and coordination. For those endogenizing the choice between FTAs and CUs when either can emerge in equilibrium, the coordination- ‡exibility trade-o¤ tension relied on either (i) the impact of uncertainty on static tari¤ setting motivations, (ii) countries entering or leaving the world trading system or (iii) transfers. My dynamic model has none of these features. In my model, the FTA ‡exibility bene…t emerges because individual FTA members have the ‡exibility to form their own subsequent agreements whereas, due to CU common external tari¤s, CU members must jointly engage in future agreements. Nevertheless, the joint approval required from members for CU expansion creates a valuable joint authority motive for CUs when CU members bene…t from permanently excluding the non-member. Further, the coordination of external tari¤s by CU members provides a myopic coordination bene…t. The trade-o¤ between the FTA and CU coordination bene…ts, which consists of a myopic CU coordination bene…t and a forward looking joint authority motive, shape the equilibrium type of PTA.
While a large leader country has the …rst opportunity to propose PTAs in each period, it cannot impose FTA formation on the second largest country who, unable to exploit the FTA ‡exibility bene…t, prefers CU formation. Rather, inducing the second largest country's acceptance of an FTA proposal requires that the large leader country threaten it prefers an FTA with the smallest country over a CU with the second largest country. In turn, market size asymmetry between the large leader country's potential partners impacts its ability to force FTA formation. As the second largest and smallest countries become closer in market size, the second largest country recognizes the stronger threat of the large leader country forming an FTA with the smallest country and becomes more amenable to FTA formation. Thus, the relative prevalence of FTA versus CU formation is higher in a small world of two small countries and one large country than a large world of two large countries and one small country. The insights stemming from the trade o¤ between the FTA ‡exibility and CU coordination bene…ts, and how they depend on market size asymmetry, appear useful in shedding some light on PTA formation in Europe and South America.
Moving forward, these insights can motivate subsequent investigation of the real world determinants of FTAs versus CUs. Building on the framework in this paper, Lake and Yildiz (2016) introduce geographic asymmetry so that certain country pairs are closer than other pairs. They show that in equilibrium, consistent with casual observation, CUs are intra-regional while FTAs are inter and intra-regional. Indeed, as part of a broader analysis investigating the empirical determinants of FTAs versus CUs that builds on their earlier work in Facchini et al. (2012) , Facchini et al. (2015) verify the systematic importance of distance. Apart from distance, the steady long term decline in globally negotiated tari¤ bindings (which cap the MFN tari¤s that countries can set) represent another prominent feature of the world trading system. Indeed, by in ‡uencing countries' MFN tari¤s, this decline may have interesting implications for the type of PTA countries choose.
Appendix

A Welfare expressions and optimal tari¤s
For the oligopoly and competing exporters model, I present consumer surplus, producer surplus and …rm pro…ts for arbitrary tari¤s and network dependent optimal MFN tari¤s.
Oligopoly model with market size asymmetry.
.
Competing exporters model with market size asymmetry.
B Proofs
The proofs begin with presentation and proof of Lemmas 3-4 and Propositions 3-4 that were not presented in the main text. After that, the proofs of Lemmas 1-2 and Propositions 1-2 from the main text follow. Notation wise,
Lemma 3 Note that i 1:28 j for any countries i and j. The following properties characterize the continuation payo¤s of countries in the oligopoly model:
(
(iii) 
:019
Thus, consider whether and that, using Lemma
. Thus, using Lemma 1(ii), a su¢ cient condition for Moreover, it is simple to verify numerically that~ i < F lex Lemma 4 Consider the competing exporters model with symmetric endowments and either symmetric market size or an arbitrarily small degree of market size asymmetry. Then, countries do not hold CU exclusion incentives. Apart from properties regarding CU exclusion incentives, the myopic properties in Lemma 1 and the continuation payo¤ properties in Lemma 3 hold.
Proof. First, consider Lemma 1.
/ e 2 . Now, for some arbitrarily small > 0, let l m s but l m < and m s < . Further, let s 1 & e. Given the strict inequalities above, only part (i) needs veri…cation. Here, let
<^ 2:601 which always holds. For (ii), :313. But, for the leader country i, rede…ne 
Proof. Throughout the proof, note that (i) equations (10)-(11) de…ne l;s ( ). Moreover, the non-economic bene…ts > 0 imply the one period payo¤ for s is higher for a PTA with l rather than m even if l = m , and analogously for m with respect to its PTA partners l and s when l = s , and analogously for l with respect to its PTA partners m and s when m = s .
Lemma 2 provides the equilibrium transitions conditional on an initial PTA. Given Stage 1(b). First, suppose m rejected l's proposal in stage 1(a) so that l can now propose to s. Let < F lex l;s ( ). Then, given parts (i) and (iii) of Lemma 1,
. Further, using Lemma 3(vi), , m accepts l's proposal of ml CU but rejects its proposal of ml F T A . In turn, l proposes ml CU to m who accepts. Hence, the equilibrium path of networks is g ? ! g
Then, using Lemma 1(i) and
If m rejects l's proposal of ml F T A , l proposes sl F T A to s in stage 1(b) and s accepts. In turn,
given V m g
by Lemma 1(v), m will accept l's proposal of ml F T A . Thus, l proposes ml F T A to m. Hence, the equilibrium path of networks is g ? ! g
Proposition 4 
F lex m;s ( ) , the equilibrium path of networks is
Proof. Throughout the proof, note that (i) equations (10)- (11) de…ne F lex l;m ( ) and
if and only if > F lex m;s ( ) and (iii) using Lemma 1(i), F lex l;m ( ) < F lex l;s ( ). Moreover, the non-economic bene…ts > 0 imply the one period payo¤ for s is higher for a PTA with l rather than m even if l = m , and analogously for m with respect to its PTA partners l and s when l = s , and analogously for l with respect to its PTA partners m and s when m = s .
Lemma 2 provides the equilibrium transitions conditional on an initial PTA. Given , where i j and PTA formation with i rather than j yields a non-economic bene…t > 0 if i = j , parts (ii) and (iv) of Lemma 1 imply that v h g H h
for h = i; j but, by de…nition,
for some k 6 = h if and only if > OU T k;h ( ). Thus, given the protocol ordering and Lemma 1(i), the equilibrium transition is g 
